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From Income Tax to Consumption Tax?
The Case of Jamaica
Roy Bahl and Sally Wallace*
Received 29 November 2006; in revised form 30 April 2007; accepted 14 May 2007

Over the past decade, a number of countries have shifted to single-rate tax systems
with broader bases and lower rates. In the U.S., there continues to be discussion of the

merits of a consumption tax, and of base-broadening reforms to the income tax system.

The objective of this paper is to demonstrate how, over time, a conventional income
tax could be converted to a flat-rate consumption tax in a developing country. The
value of this analysis, we hope, comes with the use of a real-world situation (Jamaica),
which allows us to focus on the detail that determines the feasibility of transitioning to
a flat-rate tax on consumption. Our main contribution is to show the conditions under
which the switch can be revenue-neutral.

Keywords: flat tax, consumption tax, tax policy
JEL classification: H 2, H 24, H 3

1. Introduction

The "flat-tax revolution" that has taken Eastern Europe by storm over the
last decade and the proliferation of proposals in the U.S. represent a substantial change in thinking about the right way to structure an income tax.1
Under these various reforms, income taxation has moved from a system of
progressive rates with complicated deductions, exemptions, and special treat-

ment to a system with broader bases and a single rate, and, in some cases,
closer integration of individual and business taxation. In most countries that
have moved to flat taxes, the tax base is realized income. Many economists,

however, are intrigued about the possibility of narrowing the tax base to
consumption. In the U.S., Hall and Rabushka (1983, 1995, 1996) have proposed a direct consumption tax, where income from savings is exempt from

tax and a single tax rate is imposed on businesses and individuals. Zodrow
* The authors owe thanks to two anonymous referees for helpful comments.
1 According to I he Economist (April 14, ZUlb), the "new revolution in nat taxes Degan
with Estonia's adoption of a flat-rate income tax in 1994; see table 1. Jamaica adopted
a flat-rate individual income tax in 1986 (Bahl and Wallace, 2007). Keen et al. (2006) have
surveyed the literature and the practice of flat taxes for transition countries.
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and McLure (1988) and McLure and Zodrow (2007) have led the discussion about consumption taxes in developing countries. To date, however, no
country has converted its income tax to a consumption tax.
The objective of this paper is to demonstrate how a conventional income
tax could be converted to a flat-rate consumption tax in a developing country,
and how this can be done in a revenue-neutral way. To our knowledge, no
study has estimated the revenue effects of moving from an income-based direct tax system to a consumption-based one in a developing country, although
many have argued that in principle the latter should be both economically
more desirable and administratively simpler. In this paper, we consider in
detail the changes needed to move from an income to a consumption tax base
in Jamaica, and we estimate the revenue effects of such changes. We conclude
that, at least in the case of Jamaica, the move to a consumption tax from its
present system would be revenue-neutral. However, it remains questionable
whether the net benefits reaped from such a move are sufficiently large to off-

set the significant political, economic, and administrative difficulties entailed.

The paper proceeds as follows. In the next two sections, we describe
the components of a flat-rate consumption tax and discuss its merits in the
developing-country context. We then turn to the case of Jamaica, outlining

the necessary steps for moving to a direct consumption tax there and providing a detailed analysis of the revenue consequences of each step. In the
conclusions, we consider the lessons that might be learned from the Jamaican
case about the feasibility of a gradual move to a consumption-based tax system in a developing country.
2. What Is a Flat Tax?

The flat-rate income taxes that have become widespread in Eastern Europe
and in Russia typically feature a single tax rate and a limited number of de-

ductions and exemptions (Martinez- Vazquez, Rider, Qibbayth, and Wallace,
2006; Hadler, Moloi, and Wallace, 2006; Keen, Kim, and Varsano, 2006).
These flat-rate income taxes have emphasized a base broadening that has
moved them closer to being a tax on comprehensive income. The "flat tax"
that is of concern in this paper, however, is an individual income tax that
is levied at a single rate on consumption, and is fully integrated with the
corporate income tax. The composition of the tax base, rather than the single flat rate, is the distinguishing feature of the flat tax that we discuss in

this paper. We take the Hall-Rabushka (HR) proposal (1983, 1995, 1996) as
a convenient starting point for our discussion.2
2 The HR was by no means the first proposal to replace the income tax with a consumption tax. Among those to whom flat-tax ideas are attributed are John Stuart Mill,
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The HR proposal is an integrated tax on individuals and businesses that
is levied through a postcard tax return. This return requires the taxpayer
to report wage income plus pension and retirement benefits, and provides
a deduction for family status and for dependents in the case of individuals.

Businesses would report gross revenues and deduct allowable costs (wages
and salaries, pension contributions, purchase of goods, services and materi-

als, and purchases of capital equipment, but not fringe-benefit payments).
Interest income is exempt, and deductions of interest expense are not allowed. All income is therefore subject to consistent treatment and is taxed
at one rate (above the standard-deduction-personal-exemption level). The
tax on withdrawals from savings accounts (which might eventually be used
for consumption) is treated as prepaid in that savings and nonretirement investments are made from after-tax income.3 The tax is essentially a two-part

one that taxes compensation of individuals and separately taxes businesses
through a value-added approach. McLure and Zodrow (2007, p. 289) point
out that combining this treatment of expenditures on real assets with the
tax-prepaid treatment of financial transactions yields what the Meade Commission called the real business cash-flow tax base, or R-base, and combining
it with the tax-postpaid approach yields the real-plus-financial business cashflow tax base, or R + F base.4
The treatment of savings and investment is the critical difference between
the consumption and the income base. Under the consumption base, individuals are taxed only on that part of their income and asset accumulation that is

consumed. There are two ways to do this. The tax can be prepaid, by making
contributions to qualified accounts from after-tax income, while not treating
withdrawals from these accounts as taxable income. Or the tax can be postpaid, by making deductible contributions and subjecting withdrawals to tax.
In either case, businesses fully deduct the purchase prices of assets, including
equipment, buildings, land, and the like; however, they must include revenue

from the sale of assets as taxable income. Interest and dividend payments
are not business deductions, so effectively the returns to capital are taxed
once at the business level - a form of integration of individual and corporate
taxes.

Milton Friedman (1962), David Bradford (1986), Nicholas Kaldor (1955), William Andrews (1974), and the Meade Commission (Institute of Fiscal Studies, 1973).

3 Several other versions of the consumption tax have been discussed. See Mieskowski
(1977) for a discussion of a specific cash-flow expenditure tax. The X-tax proposal
is attributed to David Bradford (1986). A helpful summary of the flat tax and
X-tax proposals is available from the President's Advisory Panel on Tax Reform at
http://www.taxreformpanel.gov/.

4 Under certain circumstances (e.g., a uniform tax rate on all transactions), the present
values of the R and R+F tax bases are equal.

This content downloaded from
107.134.157.211 on Thu, 27 Oct 2022 18:36:53 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

From Income Tax to Consumption Tax? The Case of Jamaica 399

2.1. The Advantages of a Flat Tax on Consumption
Why might a consumption tax, levied at a flat rate, have appeal in a developing or transition country? Simplification of the tax system with resulting
reduction in the costs of tax administration and compliance is usually cited

as a major benefit of a move to a consumption-based flat tax. The prepaid
version of the consumption tax would eliminate the need to audit deductions
for interest payments and pension contributions, and depreciation schedules

would be eliminated in favor of expensing capital-asset purchases. On the
individual income tax side, since only wage income would be taxed, this
could lead to a reduction in the number of returns filed. More generally, if

all income is taxed only once, we would expect that the tax administration
could do a better job than it could through monitoring and enforcing double

taxation of the same income sources. If individual and company rates are
equalized, the flat rate structure reduces the incentives for arbitrage and in

that way simplifies the job of tax administration. Expensing and ignoring
financial transactions also would be major steps in the direction of simplification. All of this could free up tax administration resources to concentrate

on other areas of enforcement (e.g., taxpayer identification, collections) or
could lead simply to a reduction in administration costs that could be passed
back to the general public.

Certainly, simplification is an advantage that we can attribute to a consumption tax, but it may be a more important benefit in the industrialized

countries than in the developing countries. This is because the individual
income tax in developing countries largely falls on formal-sector payroll
workers. The major compliance problem is with the self-employed, small
businesses, and the informal sector in general.5 The consumption tax does
not completely solve this problem. In fact, presumptive taxes based on estimated levels of wealth - one common approach to overcoming this problem

- are inconsistent with the principle of consumption taxes. An annual presumptive tax based on an individual's asset holdings does not reflect income

available for consumption. This is a special problem with consumption taxation that would have to be dealt with in developing countries (Zodrow and
McLure, 1988).
Another important benefit of a consumption tax is the elimination of the
distorting effects of inflation. Since activity is taxed on a cash-flow basis,
inflation does not play a role (McLure and Zodrow, 2007). The benefit from
a flat-rate consumption tax that most interests economists is that it eliminates

the current penalty for future consumption and thus probably increases
savings. In a developing country, the switch to a flat tax could result in
5 For a discussion of the size of the underground economy, and some estimates for individual countries, see Aim, Martinez- Vazquez, and Schneider (2004).
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increased domestic investment because the relative after-tax return to home-

country investment is improved under a consumption levy that imposes
a lower tax on capital income. In the U.S., the economic growth effects might
be quite significant. Auerbach (1997) reports potential increases in output of

2% to 4% over the first nine years of pure flat tax and 4% to 6% over the
long run. In developing countries, we would not expect domestic savings to
have any significant crowd-out impact.
There are many possible disadvantages inherent in shifting to a consumption tax. Whether the shift will draw additional investment to a developing

country depends on several factors. Certainly there are conditions in the
open economy case under which a revenue-neutral consumption tax might
actually repel certain types of investment. First, if the shift is revenue-neutral,

an increased income tax rate might dampen the after-tax return to investors.

Second, if there is a shift in the tax burden to labor, production costs in
labor-intensive industries could be driven up, and the after-tax return to in-

vestment could be reduced. Third, even if increased domestic savings did
lead to a reduction in the average cost of capital, it might not lead to a reduction for all investors. For example, in the case of Jamaica, the present income

tax regime - which features tax exemptions, tax holidays, the deductibility of
interest costs, and weak enforcement - could make the cost of capital lower

for some investments than it would be under a flat-rate consumption tax.
Perhaps most important of all, the question of whether a consumption-based
direct tax is eligible for foreign tax credits in capital-exporting countries is

still an open one (McLure and Zodrow, 2007). Finally, there are transition
costs to be reckoned with. The switch to expensing to replace deductions
would result in unused write-offs and declines in asset prices, and there is
the major issue of eligibility for foreign tax credits. Net operating losses
(NOLs) present a special transition difficulty. To achieve neutrality, NOLs
(e.g., deductions greater than income) should be carried forward with interest reflecting inflation as well (McLure and Zodrow, 2007) or should be
refunded in the year realized. The literature on transition issues is discussed

in McLure and Zodrow (2007).
All of these considerations help to make the case, we believe, that the
impacts of a consumption tax are best evaluated in the context of a particular
country.

3. Moving To a Consumption Tax
Over the past 20 years, all of Jamaica's major taxes have been the subject of

reform. The individual income tax (largely a tax on payrolls) moved from
a steeply progressive rate structure prior to a major 1986 reform to a flat rate
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of 25% with a (nonindexed) threshold. Since 1986 a number of deductions
and exemptions have crept back into the system. The company income tax
also has been simplified over the years and is currently levied at a flat rate
of 33 1/3%. The VAT, while also burdened with exemptions and zero-rating
problems, is levied at a flat rate of 16%. The general theme of tax reform has
been to focus on simplification and on efficiency concerns, and to concentrate

on broadening the tax base and removing distortions in relative prices. In
the background, revenue protection and enhancement were always major
considerations.

None of these reform programs explicitly took the objective of introduc-

ing a consumption tax, even though many policymakers argued the need
to reduce reliance on the present income tax. Nevertheless, many of the
structural changes recommended or adopted in the income tax system were
consistent with what would be needed for a flat-rate consumption tax, such
as moving to a flat rate for individual and corporate income, removing numerous individual income tax deductions, taxing certain fringe benefits, and

reducing exemptions and rationalizing zero rating under the value-added
tax. Some of the other changes adopted (or rejected) are not consistent with
moving toward a consumption tax, including the exemption of capital gains,

an allowance for tax holidays in various sectors, and differences between
individual and corporate tax rates. The question we raise here is about the
steps that would be necessary to convert the Jamaican system as it stands now

to a flat-rate consumption tax and about the feasibility of this conversion,
especially its revenue impact.
By our reckoning, five major changes in the Jamaican income tax struc-

ture would be required to move the present system to a direct consumption tax. Some of these policy changes have to do with integration of the
individual and the corporate income tax, and others are more directly focused on limiting the tax base to consumption. In the remainder of this sec-

tion, we track through these necessary changes and estimate their revenue
impacts.6

3.1. Wage and Salary Income
All income that is available for consumption expenditure should be taxed
as personal income under a consumption tax. None should be taxed twice.
This requires some important adjustments to the present income tax structure. It will be necessary to bring nontaxed fringe benefits into the individual

income tax. Those payroll taxes that are not contribution programs should
6 The revenue analysis includes behavioral impacts of tax changes but does not use a dynamic model, in that there are no second-round effects associated with changes in investments, pensions, personal savings, and the like.
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be eliminated, since they represent a double taxation of wage income. At
risk here are the education tax (a general fund levy) and HEART (a payroll
tax earmarked for labor retraining). Payroll taxes for "savings" programs include the National Insurance Scheme (NIS), the Civil Service Family Benefits

Scheme (CSFBS), and the National Housing Trust (NHT, a mortgage lottery;
Aim and Wallace, 2004). These are properly treated as future consumption,
and so contributions to them should be made from after-tax dollars; thus no
deduction of them should be allowed either for individuals or for corporations. By requiring that contributions to pension and other savings programs
be made from after-tax income (employers' and employees'), the tax on future consumption would be prepaid and all withdrawals from these accounts

would be exempt.
Based on data gathered in connection with the 2005 comprehensive reform, we have estimated the revenue impact of this package of changes.
Elimination of the education tax and HEART will result in a significant
revenue cost to government. The elimination of deductions, however, will
have an opposite effect. In the case of the contribution-type payroll taxes,
CSFBS is an employee-only tax and allows a deduction from taxable income
for "contributions." Disallowing that deduction results in a revenue gain. For

NIS, both employees and employers are presently allowed to deduct their
contributions (their mandatory NIS taxes paid), so revenue gains come from

disallowing this deduction. In the case of NHT, only employers are allowed
a deduction under current law, so there is an additional revenue pickup from
disallowing that deduction.
We estimate the revenue impact of bringing all fringe benefits into the tax

base by making use of a sample of income tax return information for employees and employers, in which fringe-benefit tax preferences are reported

as deductions or exemptions. For individuals there would be no change in
tax payments due to the proposed fringe-benefit reform, because workers
currently report all emoluments (including benefits) and then deduct those
nontaxed benefits (including housing allowance and gratuities). Instead, the
adjustment would come on the corporate side, where none of these deductions for fringe benefits would be allowed any longer. In theory, corporate
deductions and emoluments reported by individuals should be equal. If this
is an avenue for evasion under the present system, and if companies are
overreporting deductible costs, then our estimate of the revenue capture will
be too high.
The net revenue cost of the proposed changes in fringe benefits and payroll taxes would be equivalent to about 0.4% of total taxes, based on 2003
data. The payroll tax elimination would cost an amount equivalent to about
7.0% of total taxes, while the disallowance of deductions at the company
level would enable government to recapture an amount equivalent to about
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6.7% of total taxes (table 1, lines 1 and 2). While the net effect is almost
revenue-neutral, there is a shift in the locus of payments from individuals to

corporations.
Table 1

Revenue Effects of a Shift to a Direct Consumption Tax: The Case of Jamaica
Required Change Revenue Gain (Loss) Comments

As a percentage of total taxes (2003 levels)

PIT CIT Payroll Net
tax and
other
taxes

1. Eliminate +0.6 +3.3 -7.0 -3.1 HEART, education tax
noncontribution payroll eliminated; disallow
taxes, payments to company-level

contribution programs deductions for NIS,
(NIS and CSFBS) NHT, CSFBS

2. Tax fringe benefits +2.8 +2.8 Disallow company-level
deductions for fringe

benefits

3. Bring income from Negligible Negligible Negligible Disallow deductions
private pensions fully for contributions
into tax system (employers and

employees) and

eliminate current level

of exemption for
pensions received8;

public pensions

controlled for in line 1

4. Disallow corporate +11.9 +11.9 Tax once at the

deductions for interest corporate level

costs

5. Eliminate individual -9.2 -9.2 Tax once at the

income tax on corporate level

interest and dividends

6. Eliminate company +1.55 +1.55 Eliminate all
tax

incentives

incentives

7. Tax sales of assets +0.9 +0.9 Gains are effectively

taxed only at business
level; requires no
change at individual
level, as gains are not

currently taxed

8. Expense capital -3.0 -3.0 Assumes current

investments compliance rates

This content downloaded from
107.134.157.211 on Thu, 27 Oct 2022 18:36:53 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

404 Roy Bahl and Sally Wallace

Table 1

Continued

Required Change Revenue Gain (Loss) Comments

As a percentage of total taxes (2003 levels)

PIT CIT Payroll Net
tax and
other
taxes

8. Expense capital -3.0 -3.0 Assumes current
investments

compliance

rates

9. Impact of lines 1-8 -8.6 17.45 -7.0 +1.85
10. Harmonize

individual and

company income tax
rates at:

(a) 25% -1.4 -1.4
(b) 28% +2.8 -1.0 +1.8
(c) 30% +4.7 -0.6 +4.1
11. Revenue from

a decrease or increase

in general consumption

tax of:

(a) -2% -3.00
(b) -1% -1.65
(c) +1% +1.79

-3.00
-1.65
+1.79

a

Public pensions controlled for in line
Source: Estimates by authors based on

3.2. Private Pension Income

Companies and individuals can presently deduct some of the expense associated with private pension funding, and J$ 45,000 of pensions received by
individuals is untaxed in the present system. Pension income would be taxed
at the ordinary personal income tax rate under a consumption tax, since it rep-

resents income available for consumption. As noted above, the tax could be
prepaid by allowing contributions to be made from after-tax income (i.e., by
disallowing deductions for contributions). An alternative for businesses and
individuals is to allow a deduction for contributions to savings and pension

funds, but to include withdrawals in taxable income. McLure and Zodrow
(2007) note that on the business side the prepaid option could lead to various types of arbitrage. The difficulties of tracking contributions, together with

bank secrecy laws that limit access to information about withdrawals, make
the prepaid tax system a better choice for a developing country like Jamaica.
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We do not have data to make a good estimate of the revenue implications
of the change in the taxation of pensions, but it is likely very small, due to the

small amount of private pension activity in Jamaica and the small number
of tax returns filed by pensioners. The change would also not be a major
administrative hurdle. However, it might be an especially contentious political issue. Some pensioners are lower-income, and inclusion of this source of
income - even with present thresholds - might be seen as highly regressive.

3.3. Interest Income and Dividend Taxation

Jamaica taxes interest income paid to individuals (or corporations) while
allowing deductions for interest payments. The corporate and individual
income taxes are not integrated; hence there is preferential treatment for
corporate debt (e.g., the corporate tax rate at which the deduction occurs
is 33 1/3%, while the individual income tax rate is 25%). This may lead to
arbitrage in the system, and provides an incentive to adopt certain business
structures. However, this is a case where full integration of the income tax
system at one tax rate may increase the user cost of capital in the short run,

due to lack of deducibility of interest expense. Under a consumption-based
tax, interest income received by individuals would not be taxed, interest
expenses would not be deductible at the company level, and the corporate
and individual income tax rates would be equal.
The tax treatment of dividends has long been a problem in Jamaica. Some

dividends are double taxed and some are not. Dividends paid by companies
listed on the Jamaica Stock Exchange are not taxed at the individual level,
but are taxed at the corporate level because dividends are not a deductible
expense. Stocks not listed on the Jamaica exchange face both individual and
corporate taxation. Policymakers in the country have felt that encouraging
the development of a stock exchange is more important than capturing the

potential welfare gains from taxing all dividends at the same rate. Under
the integrated income tax that we evaluate here, dividends would not be
taxed at the individual level, and there would be no differentiation in tax
treatment between listed and nonlisted companies. The revenue impact is
a loss equivalent to about 0.06% of GDP.

The revenue impact of a change in the taxation of interest is not easily
estimated. In 2002, Jamaica reported interest income tax revenues equivalent in amount to about 2.2% of GDP. If we assume an average tax rate on
interest income of 25% (e.g., a blended effective corporate and individual
tax rate), then the total interest income would be equivalent to about 9% of

GDP. Disallowing the corporate deduction for interest expense at a rate of
33 1/3% yields an increase of CIT revenue equivalent to 11.9% of tax revenues (table 1, line 4) and 2.9% of GDP. Elimination of the individual income
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tax on interest and dividends together would cost an amount equivalent to
about 9.2% of tax revenues (table 1, line 5).
By our estimates, based on 2003 data, this reform would lead to a net
revenue gain equivalent to 2.7% of tax revenues (table 1, lines 4 and 5).
3.4. Elimination of Corporate Incentives
As noted by Rider (2004), the level of incentives for businesses in Jamaica
is quite large. Total company tax revenues are lower by about 0.3% of GDP
because of corporate income tax holidays. In addition, waivers and special
relief (discretionary waivers) of company taxes, stamp duty, and the GCT
cost the government an amount equivalent to about 3.6% of GDP (Bahl
and Wallace, forthcoming). We include the elimination of tax holidays in this
analysis because the availability of a tax holiday would provide for a second,

lower income tax rate and thus an easy loophole for tax avoidance. The
revenue increase associated with the elimination of tax holidays is about
1.55% of tax revenue in 2002 (row 6 of table I).7

3.5. Asset Purchases, Asset Sales, and Capital Gains

Under a consumption tax, asset sales would be taxed at the income tax
rate, and capital gains would not be brought into tax under a separate levy.
Capital investments would be expensed rather than depreciated. This reform
would eliminate a long-standing problem with the Jamaican tax system - the

loophole created by exempting capital gains from taxation (Rider, 2004).
We know that the expensing of capital-asset purchases (versus depreciation) would lead to a government revenue loss in the short run, but some
revenue increases would come from the taxation of the sale of assets. For

the revenue cost of expensing, we make an estimate based on data from
the corporate tax returns for Jamaica. Rider (2004) reports total deductions

(including depreciation) of J$2.5 billion in 2002-2003 (0.5% of GDP). If
we assume that half of those deductions are from depreciation, and if we assume that the effective rate of depreciation is 10% (based on a rough average
of the depreciation treatment reported in Rider, 2004), then full expensing
could cost about J$ 3 billion (0.7% of GDP) in the form of lost corporate tax
revenue, including the offset for a disallowance of current law depreciation.

To estimate the revenue recapture from the sale of assets, we use the
estimate of the capital gains tax from Wallace and Aim (2004). First, we
make the arbitrary assumption that 40% of gains would be attributable to
capital assets. In total, if this amount were taxed at an average rate of 30%,
7 This does not take into account the revenue cost of any investment effects associated with
the elimination of tax holdings, and it also does not include ad hoc political exemptions.
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then the revenue recapture from the sale of assets would be equivalent to
about 0.9% of tax revenues. Taxing the sales of assets and expensing capital
investments are estimated to result in a net revenue loss equivalent to about

2.1% of revenues (rows 7 and 8 in table I).8
3.6. Rate Harmonization

At present, the individual income tax rate is 25% and the company rate is
33 1/3%. So long as these rates differ, there will be behavioral influences
related to forms of incorporation, and these will influence the effective tax

rate on capital. Over the past 20 years, Jamaica has resisted harmonizing
these rates, primarily because of revenue concerns.

The move to a consumption tax requires that the income tax rates be
equalized. If we assume no base effects, a harmonizing of the individual
income tax rate with the corporate rate at 30% could generate a revenue
increase equivalent to about 4% of the current level of collections (table 1,
line 10). Dropping the corporate rate to 25% would cost the equivalent of
1.4% of collections.

The direct effect of a higher individual income tax rate (coupled with no
tax on interest income) would be an increase in the attractiveness of savings

and a lowering of the cost of capital. The indirect effects, however, might
be quite opposite, as the possible increase in labor costs might dampen the
enthusiasm for investment in Jamaica.

3.7. Total Impact
The net impact of all changes except the rate harmonization is a revenue gain
equivalent to 1.85% of tax revenue (table 1, line 9). The revenue loss of 15.6%
of total taxes - largely from removal of taxes on individuals - is more than
offset by the revenue recapture from disallowing certain deductions under
the corporate tax (17.45% of tax revenues). We argue that this small net gain

will be just enough to permit harmonizing the individual and company tax
rates at the present individual rate of 25%. This is an important finding, and
will be good news for those who are concerned about the revenue feasibility
of shifting to a consumption tax. Other revenue-neutral changes are possible,

such as reducing the GCT rate by 1%.
Though the net impact of this structural reform is close to revenue-neutral,

the individual changes that are required may be substantial. Elimination of
8 Under the plan evaluated here, the existing property tax and property transfer taxes
would continue as supplementary wealth taxes. In fact, the property transfer tax (and
stamp duty) are taxes on sales rather than on the value of holdings, but they are mostly
(75%) levied against real estate. Any asset that is taxed upon sale should not also be subject to the property transfer tax.
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the individual income tax on dividend and interest income and elimination of

two payroll taxes will reduce the direct tax on individuals. The disallowance

of deductions under the corporate tax may have approximately offsetting
revenue effects, but there will be a major shift in the point of collections to
the company level. This will have major implications for the political acceptability of this proposal, probably making it more difficult to implement, and
major implications for administration, probably in the direction of making it
easier.

4. Conclusions: A Consumption Tax?
Would a flat tax on consumption be a good choice for Jamaica? What benefits might one expect from the adoption of a consumption tax in Jamaica's

next round of reforms? Does the reform package laid out above present
insurmountable obstacles?

4.1. Revenue Neutrality
The issue of revenue neutrality is crucial. In the long run, a consumption tax

may stimulate economic growth enough to augment revenues, but a question arises as to whether, in the short run, it will be a revenue loser. If
so, this could be a death knell for the consumption tax. The results of this
research for Jamaica show that the shift to a consumption tax can be revenueneutral.

Can this result be generalized in the developing-country case? Perhaps
not. There are three reasons why the shift to a consumption tax could lead
to a significant revenue cost. First, in their zeal to protect revenues by tax-

ing easy "handles", developing countries often double tax capital income
and formal-sector labor earnings. Moving to a consumption tax base and
eliminating some of these easy tax targets (e.g., payrolls, bank deposits) will

narrow the size of the taxed base and impose a revenue cost. Second, the
transition period to a consumption tax and the "learning" of the new system may take years. Moreover, evaders and avoiders probably will learn to
manipulate the new system faster than the tax administration will learn to
enforce it, and faster than the regulations and laws can be adjusted to close
the new loopholes. Revenue losses will occur in this transition period due to

these administration and compliance adjustments. Third, there will be significant political resistance to adopting a consumption tax in place of a more
traditional income tax, even if the two do have offsetting revenue effects.
This will likely cause postponement of the adoption of some of the features
of the flat-rate consumption tax. This has indeed happened over the years in
Jamaica as various reforms have been undone.
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We estimate that the enactment of a consumption tax (as described above)

in 2003 would have been revenue-neutral. However, there is always uncertainty in revenue estimation. Four types of revenue risk might concern government most. One is that deductions by businesses under the present system

may have been overstated to reduce tax liability. In this case, our estimate
of revenue recapture is too high. Another important risk is that if the many
tax incentives in the present system remain in the consumption tax system,
that may allow taxable events to be shifted to sheltered status. Third, if there

is inadequate administration of the new system, revenue leakage will occur.
Finally, there is the question of the foreign tax-credit eligibility of the new
system as an "income tax."9
There are a number of ways to hedge against these risks during a transition

period. One possibility is to equalize the individual and corporate tax rates
at 28%, which would increase the net revenue gain from the switch. This
would provide a hedge against the risk of administrative problems in the
early years of the new tax. Note that in this case the increased tax rate on
individual income raises the tax penalty on current consumption.
4.2. Economic Growth

A major benefit expected from the adoption of a consumption tax is a reduction in the cost of capital and an enhanced attractiveness of investment
in Jamaica. But could it be that the short-term revenue cost of the transition
would not lead to tax rate and base adjustments that reduce the after-tax return to capital? As we show in table 1, under current assumptions, a revenue-

neutral direct consumption tax would allow a decrease in the company tax
rate. However, this would be accompanied by elimination of tax preferences
for a number of industries and firms that have been targeted for special treatment. This might reduce the return to capital in some sectors in the economy.

The elimination of the corporate deduction for interest expense could also
increase the cost of capital if interest income has escaped taxation under the

current system. What all of this means is that Jamaica may be a good case
study of a country where a flat-rate consumption tax would increase the relative cost of capital in the transition period and thereby decrease the short-run

positive impacts. The inflow of foreign direct investment might be retarded,
and might be reduced if the U.S. government ruled that the consumption tax

was not creditable.

On the other hand, there would likely be significant efficiency gains from
introducing a consumption tax. In Jamaica, Light (2004) uses a CGE model to

show that a broad-based consumption tax is superior to the present system
9 For a discussion of how the IRS might view a consumption tax, see McLure and Zodrow
(2007).
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in welfare effects.10 This lends some credibility to the potential economic
growth effects of a tax on consumption.
4.3. Administrative Costs

On balance, the long-term effects of a consumption tax would be to lower
both administrative costs and compliance costs. This is because the consumption version of Jamaica's flat-rate income tax would be much simpler than
the present version:

- Two payroll taxes and all related administrative and compliance costs
would be eliminated.

- Under the prepaid version of a consumption tax, dividends and interest
would be taxed only at the company level. This would lead to a reduction
in the number of year-end returns filed by individuals. If the postpaid
version were adopted, the inclusion of withdrawals from savings accounts
would probably lead to an increase in administrative costs.
- Interest expenses would no longer be deductible; hence audit costs would
be reduced.

- The present program of tax holidays would be eliminated.

- The expensing of asset purchases in place of the present complicated
depreciation system would reduce both administrative and compliance
costs.

On the side of increased costs, however, individuals and businesses would be
required to report sales of assets.
4.4. Fairness

Would the loopholes in a consumption tax that were left open for administrative, political, or legal reasons significantly compromise the fairness and
revenue productivity of the consumption tax? Jamaica has a long history of
weak tax administration, and the adoption of a direct consumption tax would
present some new challenges. The following may be the most serious:
- The system would require individuals and companies to report asset sales
and be taxed fully on them. The evidence that this would happen is not
encouraging. At present, the property transfer tax and the stamp duty
are levied on real-property and financial-asset sales, and underreporting

is rampant (Bahl and Wallace, forthcoming). This could become a major
loophole.
10 Rutherford, Light, and Barrera (2005) reach a similar conclusion in their analysis of
a broad-based VAT in Colombia.
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- The transition period would be especially difficult for companies with
assets that are not fully depreciated on the present system.

- Some form of presumptive tax would need to be developed that would
not be inconsistent with a consumption tax, i.e., would not introduce an

implicit tax on capital income. Zodrow and McLure (1988) argue that
such a tax is likely to be complicated and not easily administered.
- The tax treatment of foreign investment income will be a difficult hurdle
if foreign tax credits are to be preserved, and likely will complicate the
administration of the system.
Another dimension of fairness is the distributional impact of a consumption
tax. It is likely that a pure consumption tax would be more regressive than

Jamaica's current income-consumption tax system (Alleyne et al., 2004). If
redistribution is an important consideration for shaping the tax structure,
consumption taxes might be expected to coexist with some form of income
tax.

4.5. A Universal Consumption Tax?
How would government integrate the consumption tax base for income taxes
with the consumption tax base of the VAT? This question is not often raised,
and in fact many of the best scholars on this subject restrict their inquiry

to either direct consumption taxes (McLure and Zodrow, 2007) or the VAT
(Bird and Gendron, 2006).
There would seem to be three choices in this regard. First, as Zodrow
and McLure (1988) argue, one can make the case for replacing the VAT
with a direct tax on consumption. The primary rationale here is equity, viz.,

that under a direct consumption tax, statutory rates could be graduated
and exemptions could be provided to protect low-income families. Targeted
exemptions under a VAT are a much more difficult way to build equity
into the system. However, a direct consumption tax would miss the informal
sector in most developing countries, just as the present income tax does.
There is an argument that the VAT is the consumption tax of choice because it bypasses the hard political problems of disallowing interest expense
deductions under the income tax and of determining the tax status of pensions and fringe benefits. Some would argue that in developing countries the

VAT is more easily administered than the individual income tax. The VAT
also can capture some of the transactions involving the informal sector of
the economy, more easily than can an individual income tax. However, the
VAT as a single consumption tax is not without problems. Most importantly,

it would require quite a high statutory rate, and would put great pressure
on government to provide more tax relief to the poor (which a VAT is ill
equipped to do) and to businesses that feel overburdened.
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The third choice, and the one that makes the most practical sense for developing countries, is the simultaneous operation of both a VAT and a direct
consumption tax. This is the practice followed in most countries, though only

the Slovak Republic (of the countries we have surveyed) have introduced
a single rate for VAT, individual income tax, and corporate income tax (Keen,

Kim, and Varsano, 2006).
In Jamaica, a direct consumption tax and VAT could exist together, uncoordinated, and this would enable keeping the statutory rates for both
taxes lower. The threshold under the direct consumption tax would allow
some allowance for low-income families and could keep the pressure off
the VAT for more exemptions. The VAT would provide some coverage of
the informal sector, until the day when the tax administration catches up
and is able to effectively reach the hard-to-tax. On the other hand, the sim-

ultaneous operation of a direct consumption tax and a VAT creates some
anomalies. Consumption expenditures are in effect taxed twice: as income
received other than from savings, and as direct consumption. So, for example, in Jamaica, an income earner is taxed 25% on what he has available
to spend, and at 15% on what he consumes. On the other hand, a capital expenditure by a company is expensed and is also creditable against
VAT liability.
Jamaica fits in this third category. It has adopted a VAT. It also has adopted

some features of a direct consumption tax, but major additional revisions are
required to complete the transition. What we show here is that this can be

done with a revenue-neutral impact, administrative savings, and distributional impacts that probably would be acceptable.
The constraints on adopting a direct consumption tax are the political
will to accept such a big shock to the system, the administrative capability
to handle the shift, and the revenue risk. A bigger question is whether any

country could do so and whether policy advisors should encourage that
movement.

4.6. Good Public Policy?

Would the switch to a consumption tax be good public policy? The

contribution in this paper is to show that it could be accomplished with

significant revenue loss. In addition, we can argue that that there migh

long-run gains in the efficiency of taxation in the economy, and p
significant tax administration advantages. It might also be a rationa
removing longstanding tax distortions that many believe have plagu
Jamaican tax system (Bahl and Wallace, 2007). But the possibility of

favorable outcomes must be tempered by the various risks implied: wh

a consumption tax would be eligible for U.S. foreign tax credits, and w
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the removal of incentives in favor of a more level playing field for investors
would do great long-run harm to the economy.
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